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PARTY POOPERS: THE SUPREME COURT OVERLOOKS THE 
PARTY IN FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. COLORADO 
REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is often said that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link; if this is 
true, then a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court proved just 
how weak its rulings are in the area of campaign finance.  In a 5-4 decision, the 
Supreme Court, in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican 
Federal Campaign Committee,1 upheld limits on the amount of money a 
political party could spend on the campaigns of its candidates.2  The decision 
marked only the second time the Court has ruled on the constitutionality of 
campaign finance laws with respect to political parties.3  In reaching a decision 
in the case, however, the Court overlooked several important issues relating to 
political parties, resulting in a generally disappointing opinion plagued with 
weak links in its reasoning. 
The provision at issue in Colorado II was part of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1974 (“FECA”), which set limits on contributions made by 
individuals, political parties and political action committees (“PACs”).4  The 
 
 1. 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001) [hereinafter Colorado II]. 
 2. See id. at 2371. 
 3. The first time the Court ruled on this point was in Federal Election Commission v. 
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) [hereinafter Colorado 
I]. 
 4. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(1974).  As early as 1906, Congress recognized the need for campaign finance reform, and 
between that time and 1966, it enacted various statutes, which together, sought to: (1) limit the 
disproportionate influence of wealthy individuals and special interest groups on the outcome of 
federal elections; (2) regulate the spending in federal election campaigns; and (3) deter abuses by 
mandating public disclosure of campaign finance.  See Federal Election Commission, The FEC 
and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, available at http://www.fec.gov/pages/fecfeca.htm (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2002).  In 1971, these laws were consolidated into the Federal Election Campaign 
Act of 1971.  See id.  The 1971 Act, though more stringent than any previous attempts at 
campaign finance reform, was difficult to enforce because there was no central administrative 
authority.  See id. 
  Later, the FECA was amended in response to the July 1972 burglary of the Democratic 
National Committee in the Watergate Apartment complex and the events that ensued, including 
the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon in 1974.  See id.  Although Nixon was almost sure 
to win his bid for re-election in the 1972 Presidential race, his advisors formed the Committee to 
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Supreme Court had its first opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of the 
FECA in 1976 in Buckley v. Valeo.5  In Buckley, the Court sustained the limits 
on individual contributions,6 but held that limitations on campaign 
expenditures, independent expenditures by individuals and groups, and 
expenditures by a candidate from his personal funds were unconstitutional.7 
At first glance, the holding in Buckley seems simple to understand: 
contribution limits are constitutional, while restrictions on expenditures are 
unconstitutional.  A problem arises, however, because the Act’s definition of a 
“contribution” includes “expenditures made by any person in cooperation, 
consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, 
his authorized political committees, or their agents.”8  This effectively makes 
an expenditure that is coordinated with a candidate a contribution for purposes 
of the Act.9  “In general, FECA treats all money spent by an individual or 
organization in coordination with a candidate as though it were a direct 
contribution to that candidate, subject to the Act’s contribution ceiling.”10  
Therefore, under Buckley, limits on independent expenditures—those not made 
in coordination with a candidate—are unconstitutional, while contributions and 
coordinated expenditure limits are constitutional. 
Political parties, however, are not covered under the general provisions of 
the Act.11  Instead, Congress adopted the Party Expenditure Provision.12  The 
 
Re-elect the President, a committee later known as CREEP.  See The American President, 
Richard Nixon: The Comeback President, available at http://www.americanpresident.org/ 
KoTrain/Courses/RN/RN_Campaigns_and_Elections.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2002).  The 
committee raised hundreds of thousands of dollars from corporations promising payoffs of 
favorable legislation and ambassadorships in return.  See id.  The committee used the money to 
pay off political con artists and dirty tricksters.  Nixon and the White House were not linked to 
the burglary until later, and the President won the election in a landslide, but reports of serious 
financial abuses led Congress to amend its campaign finance laws.  Not only did the 1974 
amendments set contribution limits, they also established the Federal Election Commission 
(“FEC”) to enforce the provisions of the FECA.  Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). 
 5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 6. The individual contribution limits the Court discussed included limitations on 
contributions by individuals and groups to candidates and authorized campaign committees, 
contributions by political committees, and limits on total contributions during a calendar year.  
See id. at 1-2. 
 7. See id. at 143. 
 8. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994). 
 9. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2357 (2001).  Various limitations on contributions are 
established for individuals and political committees in the FECA. 
 10. Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 620, 625 (2000). 
 11. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(A)-(B) (1994). 
 12. Id. § 441a(d)(3).  See also Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance 
Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 91 (1987) (noting that 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] PARTY POOPERS 1003 
provision places limitations on the amount political parties may spend in 
connection with their candidates for the office of President and for other 
federal offices.13  In its last term, the Supreme Court examined the 
constitutionality of the limitations imposed on a party’s coordinated 
expenditures when it decided Colorado II.14  The case arose out of a senatorial 
election in Colorado.  The specific provision at issue provided that in elections 
for the United States Senate, each national and state party committee, “[m]ay 
not make any expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of 
a candidate for Federal office . . . which exceeds . . . the greater of (i) 2 cents 
multiplied by the voting age population of the State . . .; or (ii) $20,000.”15 
Originally, the FEC presumed that political parties were only capable of 
making expenditures that were in coordination with their candidates; meaning 
that all political party expenditures were subject to the limitations in the Party 
Expenditure Provision.16  In Colorado I, the Supreme Court held that political 
parties could make independent expenditures, that the expenditure in question 
was an independent expenditure, and that under Buckley, it was an 
unconstitutional limit on independent expenditures.17  Therefore, as applied to 
this particular expenditure, the provision was unconstitutional.  In Colorado I, 
however, the Court avoided the Colorado Republican Party’s broader claim 
that the entire Party Expenditure Provision was unconstitutional, including the 
limits imposed on coordinated expenditures.18  The question again presented 
itself before the Court in Colorado II.  This time the Court faced the issue and 
held that a party’s coordinated expenditures could be limited in light of the 
substantial governmental interest in preventing corruption.19 
In all of the campaign finance cases, the Court has wrestled with how to 
properly weigh First Amendment freedoms against governmental interests.20  
 
while the 1974 amendments to the FECA respected the role of political parties by separating them 
from other political actors, the Act also provided the first statutory limits on party activity). 
 13. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3)-(4) (1994). 
 14. See generally Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001). 
 15. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3)(A) (1994).  The FEC took the position that a party may make 
coordinated expenditures up to the above amount, in addition to the amount of direct 
contributions permitted by generally applicable contribution limits.  See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 
2366 n.16. 
 16. See David J. Lekich, Note, Still Blinking at Political Reality in Federal Elections: 
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 75 N.C. L. 
REV. 1848, 1873 (1997). 
 17. Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 604 (1996). 
 18. Id.  Instead, the Court remanded the case to the District Court of Colorado to further 
examine this issue.  For a discussion of the District Court’s holding, see infra note 72 and 
accompanying text. 
 19. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2351 (2001). 
 20. See Jeremy Marsh, Note, Missouri’s Sacrificial Lamb: Political Party Contributions and 
Campaign Finance Reform in Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 925, 933 
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The Court has held that the only government interest sufficient to uphold 
provisions of the FECA is the interest in preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption because the FECA’s contribution and expenditure 
limitations “operate in the area of the most fundamental First Amendment 
activities.”21  Political expression, including the rights of freedom of speech 
and the freedom of associating with others of similar political beliefs, is at the 
core of the First Amendment.22  In deciding which provisions to uphold, the 
Court applies a standard known as exacting scrutiny, in which it asks, “whether 
the restriction is ‘closely drawn’ to match what we have recognized as the 
‘sufficiently important’ government interest in combating political 
corruption.”23  In Colorado II, the party argued first that it should be subject to 
a higher standard of scrutiny before its speech could be limited, and, in the 
alternative, that there was not enough evidence of corruption to uphold the 
limits on its coordinated expenditures.24 
This Note examines the Court’s opinion in Colorado II and addresses 
issues relating to political parties that the Court, particularly the majority, did 
not sufficiently consider in making its ruling.  Part I of this Note looks at the 
background leading up to Colorado II, beginning with a discussion of Buckley 
and followed by an examination of the Court’s decision in Colorado I.  Part II 
analyzes the Court’s decision in Colorado II, including both the majority and 
dissenting opinions.  Part III argues that the Court’s reasoning in Colorado II 
left much to be desired because it failed to give sufficient consideration to the 
following issues: (1) the tension it was creating between the decision in 
Buckley and the decision in Colorado II; and (2) the importance of political 
parties in American society, including the status given to them in the 
Constitution as well as their role in furthering the structure of democracy.  
Finally, Part IV discusses the most recent changes regarding campaign finance 
reform legislation, specifically examining how new laws might affect political 
parties. 
 
(2001).  Marsh noted that the First Amendment is the biggest obstacle to campaign finance 
reform in America, and that the guarantee of free political speech would appear to be “an 
insurmountable obstacle to creating effective limits on campaign spending.”  Id. 
 21. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (noting that the government’s interest in 
leveling the playing field for all candidates and trying to counter skyrocketing costs of campaigns 
were not sufficient reasons to limit political expression). 
 22. Id. at 14-15 (noting that “[t]he First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such 
political expression in order to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people,” and “the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
guarantee freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and 
ideas.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 23. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2366 (citation omitted). 
 24. Id. at 2360, 2366. 
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II.  RELEVANT SUPREME COURT CAMPAIGN FINANCE DECISIONS: BUCKLEY 
AND COLORADO I 
A. Buckley v. Valeo 
Buckley v. Valeo25 was the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to rule on the 
constitutionality of the FECA,26 and it provides the general context for 
determining the constitutionality of campaign finance reform laws.  In a per 
curiam opinion27 spanning approximately 150 pages, the Court upheld 
contribution limits, but found limitations on campaign expenditures, 
independent expenditures, and a candidate’s expenditures from his personal 
funds unconstitutional.28 
The question the Court sought to answer in Buckley was not whether 
Congress had the power to legislate in the area of federal elections, but 
whether the “specific legislation that Congress has enacted interferes with First 
Amendment freedoms.”29  The Court recognized that the limitations that the 
Act placed on expenditures and contributions operated in the area of 
fundamental First Amendment activities of freedom of speech and the right of 
association.30 
In addressing limits the FECA placed on contributions, the Court stated 
that “a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute 
to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon 
the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”31  This is because a 
contribution is merely symbolic; it serves only as a general expression of 
support and communicates no underlying basis for that support.32 
 
 25. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1. 
 26. In Buckley, the Court actually considered a challenge to several portions of the FECA as 
well as to portions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.  This Note is only concerned with the 
challenges regarding contribution and expenditure limitations. 
 27. Only Justices Powell, Brennan, and Stewart joined all parts of the Court’s per curiam 
opinion.  Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Marshall, Rehnquist and Blackmun each joined 
the opinion in part and dissented in part, and each filed his own opinion. 
 28. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976).  The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia had upheld the constitutionality of both the Act’s expenditure and contribution 
provisions. 
 29. Id. at 14. 
 30. See id. at 14-15 (noting that freedom of political expression is “integral to the operation 
of the system of government established by our constitution”). 
 31. Id. at 20. 
 32. See id. at 21.  The Court further noted that: 
A limitation on the amount of money that a person may give to a candidate or campaign 
organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it 
permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in 
any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues. 
Id. 
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While the Court considered four provisions that limited contributions, the 
most significant was one which placed a $1000 ceiling on contributions by 
individuals and groups (not including political parties) to candidates and 
authorized campaign committees.33  The Court held that preventing corruption, 
the primary purpose for the Act, was sufficient to find all of the contribution 
limits constitutional.34  The Court stated that contributions not only carry a 
danger of actual corruption, but also a potential for the appearance of 
corruption.35  The $1000 ceiling dealt directly with the problem of large 
contributions, an area associated with actual and potential corruption, while 
still allowing people to engage in “independent political expression.”36 
In discussing the expenditure limitations in the FECA, the Court found that 
they represented a substantial restraint on the quantity and diversity of political 
speech.37  In its opinion, the Court considered three types of expenditures that 
the FECA sought to limit: (1) expenditures “relative to a clearly identified 
candidate,”38 also called independent expenditures; (2) a candidate’s 
expenditures from personal or family resources;39 and (3) overall campaign 
expenditures.40 
 
 33. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976). 
 34. See id. at 26-27.  The Court noted that: 
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from 
current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative 
democracy is undermined.  Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never be 
reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election 
demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one. 
Id. 
 35. See id. at 27.  The appearance of corruption stems from the “public awareness of the 
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.”  Id. 
 36. Id. at 28. 
 37. See id. at 19 (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on 
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by 
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of the exploration, and the size of the 
audience reached.”). 
 38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976).  FECA placed a $1000 ceiling on the amount a 
person could expend relative to a clearly identified candidate.  See 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1994).  
Although these expenditures were made “relative to a clearly identified candidate,” they were 
considered “independent” because of the absence of prearrangement or coordination of the 
expenditure with the candidate or his agent.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.  As the Court noted, this 
section “limits expenditures for express advocacy of candidates made totally independently of the 
candidate and his campaign.”  Id. 
 39. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51.  Section 608(a)(1) placed limits on the amount a candidate 
could spend from his personal funds or the personal funds of his immediate family in connection 
with his campaign. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1).  The amount varied depending on what office the 
candidate sought.  Id. 
 40. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54.  Section 608(c) placed limitations on overall campaign 
expenditures by candidates seeking nomination for election and election to federal office. 18 
U.S.C. § 608(c). 
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Ultimately, the Court held the limits placed on all three types of 
expenditures unconstitutional.  The Court determined that the constitutionality 
of each of the provisions turned on whether the governmental interest 
advanced in their support could satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to 
limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression.41 
With regard to the ceiling placed on independent expenditures, the Court 
found that it failed “to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming 
the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process”42 and that it 
“heavily burden[ed] core First Amendment protection.”43  Furthermore, the 
Court noted that the governmental interest in “equalizing the relative ability of 
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections” was not 
sufficient to justify the independent expenditure limits.44 
The Court made a similar determination with respect to the limitations 
placed on the expenditures by candidates from personal or family resources 
and those placed on the overall campaign expenditures by candidates seeking 
nomination for election and election to federal office.  It again found that these 
limitations did not further the governmental interest of preventing corruption 
or the appearance of corruption.  In fact, the Court noted that when a candidate 
uses personal funds it “reduces the candidate’s dependence on outside 
contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant 
risks of abuse to which the Act’s contribution limitations are directed.”45  
Furthermore, the limits on overall expenditures were not necessary because the 
problem associated with large expenditures is the danger of dependence on 
large contributions, a problem addressed in the Act’s contribution limitations 
and disclosure provisions.46 
 
 41. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45.  For an explanation of exacting scrutiny, see supra note 
23 and accompanying text. 
 42. Id. at 47-48.  The Court made two points in reaching this conclusion.  First, it argued that 
even if large independent expenditures posed the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo 
arrangements as large contributions, 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) did nothing to eliminate those dangers.  
Id. at 45.  Second, the Court noted that the limitations in § 608(e)(1) did not aid in preventing 
attempts to circumvent the Act.  Id. at 46-47. 
 43. Id. at 48. 
 44. Id. at 48-49. 
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in 
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, 
which was designed to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from 
diverse and antagonistic sources, and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. 
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 45. Id. at 53.  The Court of Appeals had also noted that “the core problem of avoiding 
undisclosed and undue influence on candidates from outside interests has lesser application when 
the monies involved come from the candidate himself or from his immediate family.”  Buckley v. 
Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 46. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55. 
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Although the Court invalidated the provisions of the FECA that dealt with 
independent expenditures, it “let stand FECA’s regulation of spending ‘in 
connection with’ an election campaign, otherwise known as a coordinated 
expenditure.”47  This category of campaign spending, which applies only to 
political parties, eventually forced the Supreme Court to examine campaign 
spending in the “political party context.”48 
B. Colorado I: The As-Applied Challenge 
Buckley established the general precedent that the Constitution permits 
individual contribution limits but it prohibits independent expenditure limits.  
Colorado I, however, provided the Supreme Court with its first chance to 
examine the limitations in the context of political parties.49  Furthermore, 
Colorado I supplied the foundation for Colorado II as the two cases arose out 
of the same facts. 
In 1986, the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee bought 
radio advertisements attacking Timothy Wirth, the Democratic Party’s likely 
senatorial candidate.50  When the ads were purchased, the Colorado 
Republican Party had not yet chosen its senatorial candidate.51  The FEC 
claimed that the party’s “expenditure” exceeded the dollar limits that a 
provision of the FECA imposed on political parties.52  The party argued that 
the expenditure limitations were unconstitutional as applied to the specific 
expenditures at issue, and also attacked the constitutionality of the entire Party 
Expenditure Provision.53 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that the expenditure in question in 
Colorado I was an independent expenditure, which according to Buckley, 
could not be restricted in light of the First Amendment.54  Although seven 
 
 47. Marsh, supra note 20, at 939.  FECA treats coordinated expenditures as contributions.  
For further discussion, see supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 628 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and 
dissenting in part) (“We had no occasion in Buckley to consider the possible First Amendment 
objections to limitations on spending by parties.”). 
 50. See id. at 608.  Wirth announced in January that he would seek the open Senate seat in 
November, but the ads were bought in April, before the Democratic primary.  Id. at 612. 
 51. Id. at 608. 
 52. Id.  The provision limited the amount of money a party could spend “ ‘in connection 
with’ a ‘general election campaign’ for congressional office.”  See id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 
441a(d)(3)).  The FEC’s charge came after the State Democratic Party complained.  Id. at 612.  It 
claimed the Colorado Party was left without a spending balance after it allotted it $103,000 
general election allotment to the National Republican Senatorial Committee.  Id. 
 53. Id. at 612. 
 54. Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 614.  The Court’s reasoning was as follows: 
Beginning with Buckley, the Court’s cases have found a fundamental constitutional 
difference between money spent to advertise one’s views independently of the candidate’s 
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justices agreed with the judgment, the Court was divided, and three basic 
positions emerged: First, the three justices that joined in the plurality opinion, 
Justices Breyer, Souter and O’Connor, did not want to reach the party’s broad 
claim that the Party Expenditure Provision was unconstitutional on its face.  
The plurality opinion focused only on the as-applied challenge to the Party 
Expenditure Provision.  The opinion addressed the fact that a political party’s 
rights were at issue rather than those of an individual and noted that “[t]he 
independent expression of a political party’s views is ‘core’ First Amendment 
activity no less than is the independent expression of individuals, candidates, 
or other political committees.”55  It further recognized that there were no 
“special dangers of corruption associated with political parties that tip the 
constitutional balance in a different direction,”56 and that the Government did 
not point to any evidence that suggested a corruption problem with respect to 
independent party expenditures.57  In deciding not to reach the party’s facial 
challenge to the statute, the plurality opinion claimed that the lower courts’ 
opinions and the parties’ briefs did not “squarely isolate, and address, party 
expenditures that in fact are coordinated.”58 
Second, Justices Thomas, Kennedy and Scalia along with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist concurred in the judgment, but all wanted to reach the Party’s 
broader challenge.59  Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion that argued 
 
campaign and money contributed to the candidate to be spent on his campaign.  This 
difference has been grounded in the observation that restrictions on the contributions 
impose only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free 
communication. . . .  In contrast, the Court has said that restrictions on independent 
expenditures significantly impair the ability of individuals and groups to engage in direct 
political advocacy and represent substantial . . . restraints on the quantity and diversity of 
political speech. 
Id. at 614-15 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 55. Id. at 616. 
 56. Id.  In further discussing the corruption issue, the Court stated that the danger involved is 
that a donor could give a $20,000 donation to a party to be used for an independent expenditure in 
support of a candidate, thus circumventing the $1000 limitation that an individual may contribute 
to a candidate.  Id. at 616-17.  “We could understand how Congress, were it to conclude that the 
potential for evasion of the individual contribution limits was a serious matter, might decide to 
change the statute’s limitations on contributions to political parties.”  Id. at 617. 
 57. Id. at 618.  The opinion also suggested that Congress wrote the Party Expenditure 
Provision “for the constitutionally insufficient purpose of reducing what it saw as wasteful and 
excessive campaign spending,” rather than because of a special concern for corruption.  Id. 
 58. Id. at 624. 
 59. Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 626 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and 
dissenting in part).  Justice Kennedy argued that the Party preserved its claim throughout the 
lower court proceedings and that because of this, the Court should reach the issue and not remand 
the case.  See id. at 626.  Justice Thomas noted that when the Party filed its counterclaim, all party 
expenditures were treated as coordinated expenditures; therefore, a reference to expenditures, 
meant both independent and coordinated and the lack of a specific reference to coordinated 
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not only in favor of reaching the facial challenge, but also that the Party 
Expenditure Provision was unconstitutional.60  He stated that under the statute, 
it is “both burdensome and quite unrealistic for a political party to attempt the 
expenditure of funds on a candidate’s behalf . . . without running afoul of 
FECA’s spending limitations.”61  His opinion argued that contribution limits 
upheld with respect to individuals and other associations did not apply to 
political parties because: 
It makes no sense . . . to ask, as FECA does, whether a party’s spending is 
made “in cooperation, consultation, or concert with” its candidate.  The answer 
in most cases will be yes, but that provides more, not less, justification for 
holding unconstitutional the statute’s attempt to control this type of party 
spending, which bears little resemblance to the contributions discussed in 
Buckley.62 
Kennedy further noted that a party and its candidates are “inextricably 
intertwined” because the party’s fate in an election is dependent on its 
candidate; therefore, the speech of a party cannot be separated from the speech 
of the candidate, and the party’s spending in cooperation with the candidate “is 
indistinguishable in substance from expenditures by the candidate or his 
campaign committee.”63 
Justice Thomas also filed an opinion, in which he made two arguments: (1) 
overrule Buckley; and (2) the corruption rationale does not apply when political 
parties are the subjects of regulation.64  Thomas based his argument in favor of 
overruling Buckley on two points: first, the contribution/expenditure distinction 
articulated in Buckley “lacked constitutional significance,”65 and second, 
 
expenditures did not prevent the Court from reaching the issue.  See id. at 632 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
 60. Id. at 626 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined this opinion. 
 61. Id. at 627. 
 62. Id. at 629.  Justice Kennedy continued, saying that a party spending in coordination with 
a candidate communicates the underlying basis for a party’s support, that the candidate will be 
elected to office and further the party’s political agenda.  Id. at 629-30. 
 63. Id. at 630.  Because Buckley held that a candidate cannot be restricted in the amount he 
spends on his campaign, it follows that a party, whose speech and spending cannot be separated 
from that of its candidate, can also not be limited.  See id.; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
54-59 (1976). 
 64. Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 631 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and 
dissenting in part). 
 65. Id. at 636.  Thomas argued that “[c]ontributions and expenditures both involve First 
Amendment expression because they further the discussion of public issues and debate on the 
qualifications of candidates . . . integral to the operation of the system of government established 
by our Constitution.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  He further noted that 
“giving and spending in the electoral process also involve basic associational rights under the 
First Amendment.”  Id. at 637.  He noted that the Court previously held that an interference with 
the freedom of a party is also an interference with the freedom of the individuals associated with 
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because both contributions and expenditures operate in an area central to the 
First Amendment, they should be subjected to strict scrutiny rather than 
exacting scrutiny.66 
Thomas also noted, however, that even without overruling Buckley, the 
Party Expenditure Provision still violated the Constitution.67  He argued that 
“the very aim of a political party is to influence its candidate’s stance on 
issues, and, if the candidate takes office or is reelected, his votes.”68  
Therefore, it is not really possible for a party to “corrupt” its candidates, and 
thus no sufficient government interest exists to limit party expenditures.69 
Finally, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented claiming that all political 
party spending in relation to the election of a candidate should be treated as a 
contribution upon which limits should be placed.70 
III.  COLORADO II: THE FACIAL CHALLENGE 
After the decision in Colorado I, the Supreme Court remanded the case to 
the district court to consider the Party’s broader claim: all limits on political 
party expenditures in connection with congressional campaigns are facially 
unconstitutional even as to spending coordinated with a candidate.71 
On remand, the District Court of Colorado held in favor of the Party and 
stated that the limits on coordinated expenditures were unconstitutional.72  The 
court found that the FEC failed to offer evidence demonstrating a compelling 
need for limiting political parties’ coordinated expenditures.73  In holding for 
the Party the court stated, “[b]ecause the FEC . . . failed to offer relevant, 
 
that party.  See id. (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality 
opinion)).  Limiting an individual’s rights to contribute as many resources as he wishes to the 
pool also limits his ability to associate for effective advocacy.  Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 637. 
 66. Id. at 640.  Strict scrutiny requires a compelling governmental interest and legislative 
means narrowly tailored to serve that interest.  Id. at 641.  For an explanation of exacting scrutiny, 
see supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 67. Id. at 644. 
 68. Id. at 646. 
 69. See Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 646 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting 
in part) (“The structure of political parties is such that the theoretical danger of those groups 
actually engaging in quid pro quos with candidates is significantly less that the threat of 
individuals or others doing so.”). 
 70. Id. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Stevens gave three reasons for limiting all political 
party spending: (1) the limits avoid the appearance and the reality of a corrupt political process; 
(2) there is an interest in blocking the attempts of individuals and certain organizations from 
circumventing the FECA’s limits on them; and (3) the Government has an interest in leveling the 
playing field, and constraining the costs of federal campaigns furthers this goal.  Id. at 648-49. 
 71. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2356 (2001). 
 72. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 41 F. Supp. 2d 
1197 (D.Colo. 1999). 
 73. See id. at 1213. 
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admissible evidence which suggests that the coordinated party expenditures 
must be limited to prevent corruption or the appearance thereof.”74 
A three-judge panel in the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision, 2-1.75  The majority found that the FEC had not demonstrated that 
political parties’ coordinated spending corrupts, or presents the appearance of 
corrupting the electoral process.76  In addition, the Tenth Circuit recognized 
that Buckley upheld limits on contributions, and that the FECA treated political 
parties’ coordinated expenditures as contributions, but the court argued that 
limitations on political parties created more that just a “marginal restriction on 
upon the [parties’] ability to engage in free communication.”77 
A. The Parties’ Arguments to the Supreme Court 
The FEC argued the case along Buckley lines, taking the precedent even 
further.  It claimed that the Party’s coordinated expenditures were the same as 
party contributions, which under Buckley were subject to limits.  The FEC also 
argued that unlimited coordinated expenditures from a party to the candidate 
“would induce individual and other nonparty contributors to give to the party 
in order to finance coordinated spending for a favored candidate beyond the 
contribution limits binding on them.”78 
The Party, on the other hand, argued two points: (1) the coordinated 
relationship between a party and its candidate so defines the party that it cannot 
function without coordinated spending; and (2) a party is uniquely able to 
spend in ways that promote candidate success.79  In response to the FEC’s 
circumvention argument, the Party claimed that donations to parties are 
relatively small, carrying little, if any, corrupting momentum with them, and 
that if circumvention were a viable threat, the First Amendment demands a 
response better tailored to that threat than a limitation on party spending.80 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 213 F.3d 1221 
(10th Cir. 2000). 
 76. See id. at 1232. “[Section] 441a(d)(3)’s limit on party spending is not closely drawn to 
the recognized governmental interest but instead constitutes an unnecessary abridgment of First 
Amendment freedoms.” Id. at 1233 (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). 
 77. Id. at 1232-33 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 (1976)). 
 78. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2361 (2001).  The threat that the FEC perceived was one 
of circumvention: “Individuals and nonparty groups who have reached the limit of direct 
contributions to a candidate give to a party with the understanding that the contribution to the 
party will produce increased party spending for the candidate’s benefit.” Id. 
 79. Id. at 2362. 
 80. Id. at 2369.  The party even offered two suggestions: First, using the earmarking 
provision of § 441a(d)(8), which provides that contributions that “are in any way earmarked or 
otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit to [a] candidate” are treated as 
contributions to that candidate.  2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(8) (1994); Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2369.  
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B. The Majority Opinion 
After Colorado I, the opinions of six of the nine justices were clear: four 
would find restrictions on coordinated expenditures in the Party Expenditure 
Provision unconstitutional, while two would uphold the limits. 81  Justices 
Breyer, Souter and O’Connor became the swing votes and all three decided to 
uphold the limits on coordinated expenditures, reversing the decisions reached 
in the lower courts.82 
Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion.  Two issues needed answering.  
The first, Souter framed as whether a political party is otherwise in a different 
position from other political speakers, giving it a claim to demand a generally 
higher standard of scrutiny before its coordinated spending was limited?83  The 
second was whether a serious threat of abuse existed when a party made 
unlimited coordinated expenditures?84 
1. Exacting Scrutiny is Appropriate 
To reach a conclusion on the former issue, the majority addressed two 
questions: (1) does limiting coordinated spending impose a unique burden on 
parties; and (2) is there a reason to think that a party’s coordinated spending 
raises the risk of corruption posed when others spend in coordination with a 
candidate?85 
The Court found that the limitations imposed on the parties did not cause 
them to suffer a unique burden under the First Amendment and that a party’s 
spending did pose a greater risk of corruption; it articulated three reasons for 
ruling this way.86  First, the Court took the position that the parties and their 
candidates are not so “joined at the hip” that most of its spending must be 
coordinated.87  Second, the party does not only serve the role of electing 
candidates, they also “act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to 
produce obligated officeholders.”88  Because parties are able to raise large 
 
Second, the party recommended replacing limits on a party’s coordinated expenditures with limits 
on contributions to parties, which imposes a lesser First Amendment burden.  Id. at 2370. 
 81. Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Scalia, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued in 
Colorado I for finding the limits unconstitutional, while Justices Stevens and Ginsburg found 
constitutional all limits on political party spending. 
 82. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2351 (2001). 
 83. Id. at 2360. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 2362. 
 87. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2363 (2001).  The Court noted that thirty years of history 
have proven otherwise, because coordinated spending by a party committee in a given race has, 
ever since the Act was amended in 1974, been, in fact, limited by the provision being challenged.  
Id.  To argue that coordinated spending beyond the limits is essential to the functioning of the 
party would be to say that political parties have not been functional for over three decades.  Id. 
 88. Id. at 2364.  The Court also stated: 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1014 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:1001 
amounts of money and spend it intelligently, individuals and PACs may use 
parties to undermine the contribution limits that apply to them.89  Finally, 
parties are no different from other political spenders; individuals and PACs 
with large amounts of money could coordinate with candidates just as parties 
do, and under the FECA they would be subject to coordinated spending 
limits.90 
The above three points led the Court to the conclusion that the parties 
should be subject to the same scrutiny applied to other political actors before 
their coordinated expenditures are restricted.  The Court applied exacting 
scrutiny; the same standard applied in Buckley, and asked, “whether the 
restriction is ‘closely drawn’ to match what [they] have recognized as the 
‘sufficiently important’ government interest in combating political 
corruption.”91 
2. There is a Substantial Threat of Abuse from Unlimited Coordinated 
Party Spending 
In deciding the second issue, the Court focused its attention on 
circumvention of valid contribution limits and claimed that unlimited 
coordinated party spending increases the risk of circumvention.92  The opinion 
 
It is this party role, which functionally unites parties with other self-interested political 
actors, that the Party Expenditure Provision targets.  This party role, accordingly, provides 
good reason to view limits on coordinated spending by parties through the same lens 
applied to such spending by donors . . . that can use parties as conduits for contributions 
meant to place candidates under obligation. 
Id. 
 89. Id. at 2365.  The Court asked: 
If the coordinated spending of other, less efficient and perhaps less practiced political 
actors can be limited consistently with the Constitution, why would the Constitution 
forbid regulation aimed at a party whose very efficiency in channeling benefits to 
candidates threatens to undermine the contribution (and hence coordinated spending) 
limits to which those other actors are unquestionably subject? 
Id. 
 90. See id. at 2365-66.  The Court also said that the parties, although not in a unique position 
from some individuals and PACs, do have an advantage because under the Party Expenditure 
Provision, parties are allowed to spend more in coordination with a candidate than other actors.  
See id. at 2366. 
 91. Id. at 2366 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-388 (2000)). 
 92. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2367.  As the Court noted, the Act was in place for thirty 
years; therefore, no recent experiences with unlimited coordinated spending existed for the Court 
to consider.  See id.  Instead, the majority determined that because there was evidence under the 
current laws that candidates, donors and parties test the limits, declaring parties’ coordinated 
spending wide open would induce circumvention and further erode contribution limits.  See id. 
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stated, “if suddenly every dollar of spending could be coordinated with the 
candidate, the inducement to circumvent would almost certainly intensify.”93 
The Court also addressed the two alternatives that the Party suggested to 
limiting its coordinated expenditures to prevent circumvention.  In response to 
the Party’s claim that the earmarking provision of § 441a(d)(8) would prevent 
circumvention, the Court said that it would reach “only the most clumsy 
attempts to pass contributions through to candidates.”94  In regards to the 
Party’s second suggestion, that Congress limit contributions to parties, the 
Court replied that “the choice is between limiting contributions and limiting 
expenditures whose special value as expenditures is also the source of their 
power to corrupt”95 and Congress is entitled to choose which to limit.96 
The majority thus upheld restrictions on a party’s coordinated spending to 
minimize circumvention of contribution limits constitutional.97 
C. The Dissent 
As in Colorado I, Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in Colorado II, 
and Justices Kennedy and Scalia joined him.98  Thomas cited three reasons for 
rejecting the majority’s conclusion: (1) the Party Expenditure Provision swept 
too broadly; (2) it interfered with the party-candidate relationship; and (3) no 
proof existed that it was necessary to combat corruption.99 
 
 93. Id. at 2368.  The Court offered an example to illustrate the possibility of circumvention.  
It said that if a candidate could arrange for a party committee to foot his bills, to be paid with 
$20,000 contributions to the party by his supporters, the number of donors necessary to raise 
$1,000,000 could be reduced from 500 to 46.  Id. at 2368.  This, of course, would be too obvious, 
but the example illustrated the “undeniable inducement to more subtle circumvention.”  Id. at 
2368 n.23. 
 94. Id. at 2370. 
 95. Id. at 2371.  The opinion discussed the difference between the Court’s decision in 
Colorado I and its decision here, noting that in the former instance, the expenditures were not 
“potential alter egos for contributions,” but were independent expenditures, which under Buckley 
deserved “the most demanding First Amendment scrutiny.”  Id. at 2370.  According to the Court, 
the expenditure at issue in Colorado II was the functional equivalent of a direct contribution to a 
candidate, and unlimited coordinated party spending would lead to increased contributions to 
parties to finance direct spending on a candidate.  See id. at 2371. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2371 (2001). 
 98. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Part II of the dissent. 
 99. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2371 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Citing to his opinion in 
Colorado I, Justice Thomas again noted that he would overrule Buckley and apply strict scrutiny.  
See id.  Under that standard, he argued, this provision could not survive.  See id. at 2372.  He 
continued, stating, “I remain baffled that this Court has extended the most generous First 
Amendment safeguards to filing lawsuits, wearing profane jackets, and exhibiting drive-in 
movies with nudity, but has offered only tepid protection to the core speech and associational 
rights that our Founders sought to defend.”  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1016 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:1001 
1. The Provision is Too Broad and Disrupts the Party-Candidate 
Relationship 
In addressing the first two points listed above, Thomas argued that the 
majority reached two flawed conclusions: first, that coordinated expenditures 
by political parties are no different from contributions, and, second, that 
political parties are no different from other political actors, for example, PACs 
and individuals.  With regards to the majority’s first “flaw,” the dissent 
suggested that some party expenditures that the majority would consider 
“coordinated” actually resemble independent expenditures, and should be 
entitled to the same protections.100  These “coordinated expenditures,” argued 
Thomas, constitute more than a “‘general expression of support for the 
candidate and his views,’ [but served] as a communication of ‘the underlying 
basis for the support.’”101 
Justice Thomas adopted the words from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Colorado I to discuss the second flawed conclusion the majority reached.102  
He argued that the Buckley distinction between contributions and expenditures 
cannot apply when the source of the funds is a political party.103  According to 
Thomas, because the successes and failures of a party are directly related to 
getting its candidates elected, it is only natural for a party to work with and to 
coordinate its efforts with its candidates.104  Furthermore, the opinion 
suggested that forcing a party to maintain independence from its candidate to 
ensure that all spending is not coordinated and, therefore, restricted, creates 
various problems for a party.105 
 
  Yet, Thomas focused his dissent on the fact that, even if the Court felt bound to follow 
Buckley’s exacting scrutiny, the Party Expenditure Provision was unconstitutional.  See id. at 
2371.  “Even under Buckley, which described the requisite scrutiny as ‘exacting’ and ‘rigorous,’ 
the regulation cannot pass constitutional muster.”  Id. at 2372 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 16 (1976)). 
 100. Id.  The dissent offered an example of this: a party develops an ad campaign for 
television touting a candidate’s record on education, and the party simply “consult[s]” with the 
candidate regarding the time slot.  Id. at 2373.  While the statute would consider this coordinated, 
Thomas saw “no constitutional difference between this expenditure and a purely independent 
one.”  Id. 
 101. Id. at 2373 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)). 
 102. See id. (“Political parties and their candidates are ‘inextricably intertwined’ in the 
conduct of an election.”) (quoting Colorado I , 518 U.S. 604, 630 (1996) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)). 
 103. See id. (“Restricting contributions by individuals and political committees may, under 
Buckley, entail only a ‘marginal restriction,’ . . . but the same cannot be said about limitations on 
political parties.”) (citation omitted). 
 104. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2373 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 105. See id. at 2374.  Thomas further acknowledged that to maintain some independence a 
national party would have to establish separate entities that made independent expenditures.  Id. 
at 2374.  This independence could create voter confusion and might undermine the candidate that 
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2. The Party Expenditure Provision Does Not Prevent Corruption 
Justice Thomas’ other reason for dissenting rested on his belief that the 
government failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a party’s 
coordinated expenditures lead to corruption or that the restriction is closely 
drawn to prevent this corruption.106  He argued that even if the government had 
concrete evidence of corruption through circumvention, “better tailored 
alternatives” existed to address that type of corruption.107  Thomas agreed with 
the Party’s two suggestions, noting that either enforcement of the earmarking 
provision in § 441a(d)(8) or, in the alternative, lowering the cap on 
contributions to political parties while allowing the party to spend without 
restriction, would be an appropriate remedy.108  Thomas concluded that “it 
makes no sense to contravene a political party’s core First Amendment rights 
because of what a third party might unlawfully try to do.  Instead of broadly 
restricting political parties’ speech, the Government should have pursued 
better-tailored alternatives for combating the alleged corruption.”109 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the majority reached flawed 
conclusions in its decision to uphold the limits on political parties’ coordinated 
expenditures.  The real problem in Colorado II was not the majority’s 
conclusions, but rather the reasoning behind those conclusions.  Colorado II 
left much to be desired in part because the majority did not give sufficient 
consideration to two important points.  First, the majority’s decision in 
Colorado II deviated from the reasoning set out in Buckley, resulting in a 
tension between the two opinions as well as significant inconsistencies.  
Second, the Court attached no importance to the unique role that political 
parties play in American society, and avoided an examination of both the 
integral part they play in the structure of democracy and the status they are 
granted under the Constitution. 
 
the party sought to support.  See id.  These extra burdens illustrate that limitations on a party’s 
coordinated expenditures restrict the party’s ability to perform its primary function.  See id. 
 106. Id. at 2376.  The dissent did recognize that preventing corruption is a sufficient interest, 
but noted that Congress’ intent in writing the Party Expenditure Provision was not to prevent 
corruption, but rather “for the constitutionally insufficient purpose of reducing what it saw as 
wasteful and excessive campaign spending.” Id. at 2376-77. 
 107. Id. at 2379-80. 
 108. Id. at 2380.  For an explanation of the earmarking provision, see supra note 80 and 
accompanying text.  Thomas argued that these two alternatives direct the speech restriction at the 
source of the alleged corruption.  Id. at 2380.  He said that “‘[t]he normal method of deterring 
unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it.’”  Id. 
(quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1762 (2001)). 
 109. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2380. 
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A. Tension Between Buckley and Colorado II 
When comparing Buckley and Colorado II, two basic points of tension 
become obvious. First, Buckley held that the Constitution did not permit the 
FEC to limit the amount of money a candidate spent out of his own personal or 
family accounts.110  Yet, in Colorado II, the majority upheld the limitations on 
a party’s spending in coordination with its candidate because it found there 
was a sufficient threat of corruption, and that the restrictions on a political 
party’s coordinated expenditures in no way frustrated the First Amendment 
rights of political parties.111  In making this finding, the Court failed to 
recognize the unique relationship that exists between the party and its 
candidates: a relationship that results in the two being “virtual alter egos.”112 
Second, Buckley held that there must be a substantial governmental interest 
in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption to justify limiting the 
First Amendment rights of speech and association—the two core First 
Amendment freedoms at issue in both Buckley and Colorado II.  The majority 
in Colorado II, however, found the restrictions constitutional despite the fact 
that the government presented no evidence that the Party Expenditure 
Provision prevented either actual or potential corruption. 
1. The Party is Not a Mere Contributor 
The Court’s decision in Colorado II results in political parties being treated 
like any other contributor, such as PACs and individuals.  The party, however, 
has a very different relationship with candidates than do other contributors, and 
because of this, a party’s spending on a candidate’s election could be equated 
to a candidate spending his personal funds, a possibility the majority in 
Colorado II never considered. 
In the context of an election, the party and its candidates are “inextricably 
intertwined.”113  This argument was made in an opinion from the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case decided in between the Supreme Court’s 
rulings in Colorado I and Colorado II.114  In Missouri Republican Party v. 
Lamb, the Eighth Circuit held that a Missouri statute limiting the amount of 
cash and in-kind contributions that political parties may give to a candidate for 
public office violated the First Amendment.115  In writing for the court, Judge 
Morris Shepherd Arnold argued that distinguishing the party from its candidate 
 
 110. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976). 
 111. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2351. 
 112. Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 113. Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 630 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and 
dissenting in part) (“The party’s form of organization and the fact that its fate in an election is 
inextricably intertwined with that of its candidates cannot provide a basis for the restrictions 
imposed here.”).  See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2373 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 114. See Lamb, 227 F.3d at 1070. 
 115. See id. at 1071. 
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is, at the least, a difficult task.116  He noted that the principal way that parties 
express themselves is through the speech of their candidates, and that, at times, 
the parties and their candidates are “virtual alter egos.”117  Furthermore, the 
opinion argued that the main object of a political party is to get its candidates 
elected to office, so the speech of its candidates is also its own speech.118 
The reason that a political party focuses so much attention on electing 
candidates is that parties exist to develop and promote a platform; a party has 
an agenda and goals that it seeks to further.  It does this by nominating 
candidates who, throughout the election, will be identified with that party.119  
The positions of the party are the essence of that party, and it seeks to elect 
candidates that adhere to a core set of beliefs that furthers the party’s 
position.120  The success or failure of a party is directly related to the election 
of its candidates; if a candidate wins, his party also wins.121  Therefore, the 
close ties that exist between a political party and its candidates require that 
they be able to coordinate; coordination is not just one of many freely available 
options for party expression, it is really the only way a candidate and party can 
work towards achieving their common goals.122 
The real problem is that the Court treated the party as another contributor, 
putting it on the same level as an individual or PAC.  In reality, however, the 
parties are really separate actors similar to the candidates themselves.  Parties 
are not in place merely to contribute money to a candidate’s campaign, they 
exist to further their own political agendas, and to do that, they nominate 
candidates and assist those candidates in getting elected.123  In light of the fact 
 
 116. See id.  Arnold went even further with this argument, saying that often the party and its 
candidate are virtually indistinguishable from each other, and their identities are merged in a way 
that makes dealings between them more than merely transient symbiotic ones between separate 
and distinct entities.  Id. at 1072. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 629 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and 
dissenting in part).  Justice Kennedy recognized that a party has traditions and principles that may 
transcend the interests of individual candidates, but in the context of an election, candidates are 
absolutely necessary in getting the party’s message out, and parties are necessary to get the 
candidate’s message known.  Id. 
 120. See Peter J. Wallison, It’s Not Corruption, It’s Politics, WASH. POST, June 3, 2001, at 
B1. 
 121. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2373 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 122. See Respondent’s Brief at 25, Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001) (No. 00-191).  The 
Respondents in Colorado II further argued that, “[f]or a political party, entering in a working 
relationship with a candidate is not just one of a range of equally available options.  To the 
contrary, party candidates exist because parties nominate them, and from the moment a party 
makes a nomination, a natural, strong, and unique tie is established.”  Id. at 26. 
 123. See Nahra, supra note 12, at 102 (noting that the party can only fulfill its goals and 
express its opinions through its candidates). See also Marsh, supra note 20, at 954 (noting that 
“the object of the party is to elect its candidates for office”). 
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that parties are separate actors, not mere contributors, a strong argument exists 
for treating parties the same as candidates, with the restrictions placed on the 
amount of money that can be contributed to the party, not on the amount that 
the party can spend. 
The justification for not allowing limits on the amount that a candidate can 
spend from his own personal funds is that there is no substantial threat of 
corruption.  The same holds true in the case of political parties spending in 
coordination with their candidates.  Just as with a candidate, the use of party 
funds “reduces the candidate’s dependence on outside contributions and 
thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to 
which the Act’s contribution limits are directed.”124 
2. The Threat of Corruption is Not Substantial 
In Buckley, the Court held that the only justification for limiting core First 
Amendment protections is a substantial threat of corruption.125  Yet, in 
Colorado II, the Court upheld the restrictions on political parties with little 
evidence of corruption; in fact, the Court relied on pure speculation in reaching 
its conclusion. 
Not only has the Court recognized the threat of corruption as the only 
legitimate reason for upholding limits on contributions, it defines this 
corruption as an explicit quid pro quo arrangement.126  As discussed above, a 
valid threat of a party corrupting its candidates does not exist.  Parties and 
candidates work together for a common goal; the party does not need to exert 
influence over its candidates.  Parties choose candidates who, at least to some 
extent, have shown agreement with that party’s views.127  This, however, is not 
the kind of corruption that the Court spoke of in Colorado II.  Instead, it saw a 
substantial threat of circumvention of other contribution limits warranting 
limits on the Party’s coordinated expenditures.  The situation that the Court 
contemplated in Colorado II was as follows: an individual makes the 
maximum direct contribution to a specific candidate that is allowed under the 
 
 124. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976).  See Nahra, supra note 12, at 102.  In his 
opinion in Colorado I, Justice Thomas also noted that if a party spends large amounts of money 
on the election of one of its candidates, that candidate wins, takes office and implements the 
parties’ platform that is not corruption; rather that is “successful advocacy of ideas in the political 
marketplace and representative government in a party system.”  518 U.S. at 646 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
 125. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.  The Court also reaffirmed this position in Federal Election 
Commission v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985) [hereinafter NCPAC].  See also 
Nahra, supra note 12, at 102.  Nahra noted that in NCPAC the Supreme Court reemphasized that 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption was the only legitimate rationale for 
limiting the exercise of fundamental First Amendment rights in the context of a campaign.  Id. 
(citing NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 500-501). 
 126. See Nahra, supra note 12, at 102 (citing NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497). 
 127. See id. at 105. 
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Act and then, still wanting to give more to that candidate, the individual 
contributes money to that candidate’s political party, with the understanding 
that the money is to go towards that candidates’ election.128 
Although one can see how circumvention of other contribution limits 
might occur, the fact remains that the Court had little, if any, proof that it 
would occur.  In arguing that a substantial threat of corruption did exist, the 
Court could only point to a system the Democratic Party used, commonly 
known as tallying.129  Tallying is basically an informal agreement that if a 
candidate helps the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) raise 
funds the DSCC will, in turn, help the candidates’ campaign.130  The majority 
found that this process of tallying was “a sign that contribution limits are being 
diluted and could be diluted further if the floodgates were open.”131  Yet, given 
the relationship between the party and its candidates and the fact that in an 
election the two are working not just for themselves but also for each other, it 
hardly seems unreasonable that a party would make an agreement that if a 
candidate helps it, it will help the candidate.  The Court also suggested that 
because a candidate could expect his donation from the DSCC to be related to 
how much he raised for the DSCC that this would lead to corruption. 
The problem with the Court’s rationale is that there was no proof that the 
candidates knew who donated the money to the DSCC and how much each 
individual gave.  As previously noted, the corruption that the Court has 
recognized as sufficient to uphold the contribution limits is a quid pro quo 
arrangement, which does not present a problem when a party gives money to 
its candidate.  Similarly, a party giving the money it raised from individuals to 
a candidate raises no threat of a quid pro quo arrangement unless the candidate 
knows who contributed the money to that party.  The fact that a candidate 
receives an amount from the party in proportion to what he raises for the party 
does not by itself lead to corruption. 
Furthermore, even if circumvention is a substantial threat, the Court should 
have given more consideration to the alternatives available to limiting the 
speech of political parties, organizations that, by their own right, do not pose a 
threat of corruption.  As the dissent and the Party noted, two alternatives exist.  
The first involves a provision in the FECA itself, known as the earmarking 
provision.  This provision makes it illegal for an individual to donate money to 
a party for use on a specific candidate’s campaign.132  It appears that this 
provision is a direct solution to the problem of circumvention.  The majority, 
 
 128. See Colorado II, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 2367 (2001). 
 129. See id. at 2368. 
 130. See id.  In its discussion on tallying, the majority relied on declarations by various 
individuals in the Democratic Party. 
 131. Id. at 2368 n.22.  The Court suggested that the obvious reason for tallying was that the 
party wants to know who gets the benefit of the money raised by the party.  Id. 
 132. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8) (1994). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1022 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:1001 
however, dismissed it as a rule that “would reach only the most clumsy 
attempts to pass contributions through to candidates.”133  As the dissent 
pointed out, however, the Court provided no evidence that this rule did not 
address the problem at hand.  The other alternative available is to lower the 
amount that an individual can contribute to a political party, rather than 
limiting the amount that a party could spend in coordination with its 
candidates.  If a threat of corruption through circumvention does exist, aiming 
the remedy directly at the culprits, individuals and PACs, is a more appropriate 
and direct measure than denying a political party its First Amendment rights. 
B. The Role of Political Parties in the United States 
Figuring out exactly what the role of political parties entails in American 
society is a difficult task, and one that well exceeds the bounds of this Note.  
No matter how their role is defined, however, one thing remains clear: political 
parties are an important force in the politics of the United States.  Therefore, 
the distinction between contributions and expenditures first articulated in 
Buckley, and ever-present in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance cases, 
cannot withstand a challenge by a political party.  In other words, the Court’s 
ruling in Buckley, that limits for individuals and political committees were 
constitutional because they imposed only a “marginal restriction” on the rights 
of freedom of speech and association, did not contemplate contributions from 
political parties.  Yet, in Colorado II, the Court never considered that while the 
above may hold true for mere contributors, limits on political party 
contributions, or coordinated expenditures, might impose a greater burden.  
The majority’s failure to consider this possibility reflects an even larger 
oversight on its part: the Court did not attach any significance to either the 
status of parties under the Constitution or the role that parties play in furthering 
the goal of democracy set out in the Constitution. 
1. The Constitutional Status of Parties 
It is no secret that the Framers of the Constitution feared parties, and that 
parties are not mentioned in the Constitution.134  While there were many ideas 
the Framers could not agree on, they did share “a common conviction about 
 
 133. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2370. 
 134. See Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Political Parties and American Constitutionalism, in 
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 1 (Peter W. Schramm & 
Bradford P. Wilson eds., 1993).  The author notes, however, that America is not unique for 
leaving parties out of its constitution; most free countries do not mention parties in their 
constitutions.  Id.  Yet, in the case of the United States Constitution, it is true that the original 
version did not imagine that there would be political parties.  One commentator even noted that 
the Founders “feared and despised political parties.”  James A. Gardner, Can Party Politics Be 
Virtuous?, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 667, 667 (2000). 
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the baneful effects of the spirit of the party.”135  In fact, in The Federalist No. 
10, James Madison’s hostile opinions of permanent political parties are quite 
evident.136  George Washington also warned against them in his Farewell 
Address, and Alexander Hamilton said that the Constitution’s goal was “to 
abolish factions, and to unite all parties for the general welfare.”137 
Part of the problem that the Framers had with parties, however, was that 
they viewed parties as the same thing as factions, when in fact the two are 
different.138  One scholar noted that political parties today are “parties of 
principle,” while factions are “parties of interest.”139  It was the latter that the 
Framers really feared, but because they used the two terms interchangeably, 
political parties were also suspect.140  While the Framers feared parties, or 
factions, even Madison recognized that the causes of faction—differing 
opinions, passions, and interests—could not be removed.  Therefore, the idea 
was to find a way to control the effects of faction, rather than prevent them 
entirely.141 
Despite this fear of political parties that the Framers expressed, political 
parties soon became “a part of the machinery of government in a manner that 
went well beyond Madison’s resigned acceptance of them as evils that would 
always be there.”142  Ironically, the very people who warned of the evils of 
political parties were at the forefront of the rise of the party, so that the 
 
 135. Petitioner’s Brief at 39, Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001) (No. 00-191).  See RICHARD 
HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 2 (1969).  Hofstadter commented further that the 
Framers all seemed to agree that an effective constitution would be one that successfully 
counteracted the work of parties.  Id. at 53. 
 136. Mansfield, supra note 134, at 5.  Madison argued in favor of a republic; he thought that 
America should be governed by a majority faction, but instead of factions fixed in parties 
organized for a long life, he anticipated temporary, shifting coalitions.  See generally THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 137. Gardner, supra note 134, at 667 (quoting Alexander Hamilton in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATES: CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 320 
(Jonathan Elliot, ed., Hein & Co. reprint ed. 1996)). 
 138. See DEAN MCSWEENEY & JOHN ZVESPER, AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 7 (1991); 
HOFSTADTER, supra note 135, at 64 (noting that Madison used the words party and factions as 
synonyms). 
 139. MCSWEENEY & ZVESPER, supra note 138, at 7.  Madison defined faction as: “[A] 
number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and 
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other 
citizens, or to he permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”  Id. (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)). See also HOFSTADTER, supra note 135, at 65 n.26 (noting 
that Edmund Burke defined “party” as based on principles at aiming to advance common 
interests, while Madison defined both “party” and “faction” as passions and interest aimed at 
threatening the general welfare). 
 140. MCSWEENEY & ZVESPER, supra note 138, at 7. 
 141. HOFSTADTER, supra note 135, at 66.  Madison felt that plurality and variety would 
prevent the emergence of a cohesive and oppressive majority.  See id. at 67. 
 142. Id. at 70. 
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formation of national political parties and the formation of the republic were 
almost concurrent.143  Over the years, political parties have become the force 
that drives the Constitution, enabling it to remain a working document.144 
Although it is clear that the Framers did not intend to give constitutional 
significance to the parties, Article III, as well as amendments to the original 
document, suggests that parties do have constitutional status.  While parties are 
still not mentioned in the Constitution, the passage of the Twelfth and Twenty-
fifth Amendments suggests that the Constitution recognizes their 
importance.145 
The Twelfth Amendment, passed in 1804, states, in pertinent part, that: 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for 
President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant 
of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person 
voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-
President.146 
This amendment provided for separate elector votes for President and Vice-
President.  Prior to its passage, Article II had governed the election, stating 
that: 
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two 
Persons . . . . The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the 
President . . . . [a]fter the Choice of the President, the Person having the 
greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice-President.147 
Under Article II, it was possible that the President and Vice-President would 
not be from the same party, and this, in fact, happened in 1796 when John 
Adams, a Federalist, became President, and Thomas Jefferson, a Democratic-
 
 143. See Petitioner’s Brief at 41, Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001) (No. 00-191) (quoting 
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000)). 
 144. HOFSTADTER, supra note 135, at 70.  Hofstadter quoted Lord Bryce: 
The whole machinery, both of national and State governments, is worked by political 
parties. . . . The spirit and force of party has in America been as essential to the action of 
the machinery of government as steam is to a locomotive engine. . . . The actual working 
of party government is not only one of full interest and instruction, but is so unlike what a 
student of the Federal Constitution could have expected or foreseen, that it is the thing of 
all others which anyone writing about America ought to try to portray. 
Id. (quoting 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 6 (3d ed. 1897); 2 id. at 3, 4)).  
See Mansfield, supra note 134, at 4 (noting that we should not be surprised that while parties are 
not mentioned in the Constitution, they are necessary to the working of the Constitution). 
 145. One scholar has argued that the Constitution cannot mention parties because:“The 
American Constitution confines itself to formal statements of the powers and terms of its offices, 
not prescribing how they are to be exercised. . . .  If [parties] were mentioned in the 
Constitution . . . [parties] would have had to be described formally . . . .”  Mansfield, supra note 
134, at 2. 
 146. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 147. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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Republican, became the Vice-President.148  After this election, many became 
convinced that an amendment was needed to require separate ballots for 
President and Vice-President.149  This need became even more apparent after 
the turbulent election of 1800, in which Jefferson, again a Presidential 
candidate, and his running mate, Vice-Presidential candidate Aaron Burr, 
received the same number of votes throwing the decision into the House of 
Representatives.150 
By providing for the separate election of the President and Vice-President, 
the Twelfth Amendment acknowledged the role of partisanship in the electoral 
process.151  No longer could the President and Vice-President come from 
different parties; instead, electors would not only vote for candidates, but also 
for parties.  As Lloyd Cutler put it: 
[T]he Constitution [, under the Twelfth Amendment,] requires voters to vote 
for electors who normally cast their ballots for one party’s presidential and 
vice-presidential candidates as a team.  In 1984, it was not possible to vote for 
Reagan and Ferraro, or for Mondale and Bush.152 
Similarly, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment also gave constitutional status to 
the parties.  The Amendment, passed in 1967, addresses presidential 
succession, presidential disability, and vice-presidential replacement.153 
 
 148. See William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. LEGIS. 
145, 154 (1996).  In that election, John Adams, the Presidential candidate from the Federalist 
party, received three more votes than Thomas Jefferson, the Democratic-Republican Presidential 
candidate.  However, a large number of Federalist electors did not cast their votes for the 
Federalist’s Vice-Presidential candidate, Thomas Pinckney, so that Jefferson was elected Vice 
President.  Id. 
 149. See id. at 155. 
 150. See Victor Williams & Alison M. MacDonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 1 and Its 
Twelfth Amendment Restatement: Challenging Our Nation’s Malapportioned, Undemocratic 
Presidential Election Systems, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 201, 202-03 (1994).  See also Josephson & 
Ross, supra note 148, at 155 (“Because the Federalists had lost the vice presidency in 1796, the 
Republican electors in 1800 were afraid or unwilling to chance a similar result.”). 
 151. See MCSWEENEY & ZVESPER, supra note 138, at 40.  See also Charles R. Kesler, 
Political Parties, The Constitution, and the Future of American Politics, in AMERICAN 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 233 (1993) (noting that the “single 
constitutional change needed to accommodate political parties was the Twelfth Amendment, 
which in effect transferred from the electoral college to political parties many of the deliberative 
functions integral to presidential selection”). 
 152. Lloyd N. Cutler, Party Government Under the American Constitution, 134 U. PA. L. 
REV. 25, 39 n.70 (1985). 
 153. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV; George Anastoplo, Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States: A Commentary, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 828 (1992).  See also John D. 
Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: An Explanation and Defense, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
481, 489 (1995).  Feerick noted that the need for this amendment was realized after President 
Dwight Eisenhower suffered a heart attack and Vice-President Richard Nixon attended to the 
President’s affairs while he recovered.  Id.  Although this worked out well at the time, had the 
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Prior to the passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, succession to the 
presidency when the office of Vice-President was vacated was prescribed by 
an act of Congress.154  This usually meant that the Speaker of the House was 
 
country been in a serious international crisis, this system would not have worked.  The Twenty-
Fifth Amendment states the following: 
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or 
resignation, the Vice President shall become President. 
 
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President 
shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority 
vote of both Houses of Congress. 
 
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable 
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written 
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice 
President as Acting President. 
 
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of 
the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, 
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers 
and duties of the office as Acting President. 
 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability 
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a 
majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body 
as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration 
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.  Thereupon 
Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not 
in session.  If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written 
declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is 
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue 
to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the 
powers and duties of his office. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
 154. See Anastaplo, supra note 153, at 828; See also U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 6.  This 
clause states: 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or 
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve on 
the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, 
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what 
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the 
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. 
Id. 
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next in line, but this made it possible for the Presidency to shift from one 
political party to another.155  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, however, 
provides a procedure for filling a vacancy in this situation, thus reducing the 
possibility of resorting to the statutory line of succession.156 
Yet, parties did not only obtain constitutional status through the passage of 
amendments.  The original document also elevated the status of the party 
through a theory known as “partisan entrenchment.”157  In an article entitled 
Understanding The Constitutional Revolution, Jack Balkin and Sanford 
Levinson suggest that political parties help bring about constitutional 
revolutions and changes in American constitutional law.158  The argument is 
that over time, the Constitution changes because of Article III interpretation, 
and the party, through presidential appointments to the judiciary, plays a role 
in this change.159 
When a party wins the White House, it can stock the federal judiciary with 
members of its own party, assuming a relatively acquiescent Senate. . . . 
[Federal judges] are temporally extended representatives of particular parties, 
and hence, of popular understandings about public policy and the Constitution.  
The temporal extension of partisan representation is what we mean by partisan 
entrenchment.160 
In other words, a political party is able to place its own members in the federal 
judiciary, and when enough members of a particular party are appointed to the 
federal judiciary, they start to change the understandings of the Constitution.161  
“Parties who control the presidency install jurists of their liking. . . . Those 
jurists in turn create decisions which are embodied in constitutional doctrine 
and continue to have influence long after those who nominated and confirmed 
the jurists have left office.”162  Therefore, parties attain a status under the 
Constitution by way of their ability to affect the interpretations of it through 
presidential appointments of Article III judges. 
In sum, political parties, though not mentioned in the Constitution, do 
obtain constitutional status by way of the Twelfth and Twenty-Fifth 
Amendments, as well as through presidential appointments.  Through these 
provisions, the Constitution recognizes that parties are extensions of the 
candidates.  One cannot exist without the other.  In Colorado II, however, the 
Court failed to recognize the significance the Constitution attaches to the party.  
 
 155. See Anastoplo, supra note 153, at 828. 
 156. See Feerick, supra note 153, at 498. 
 157. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (2001). 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. at 1068. 
 160. Id. at 1067. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 157, at 1076. 
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The opinion did not acknowledge or even explore the possibility that parties 
obtain a special status under the Constitution.  The Court failed to see that in 
upholding the limits on the amount a party could spend in coordination with its 
candidates, it was preventing the party from performing its constitutional 
functions. 
2. The Role of Parties in Furthering Democracy 
Even if one remains skeptical about the notion that parties have a 
significant constitutional status, it is hard to ignore their influence in furthering 
the goals of the Constitution, namely in strengthening the ideal of democracy.  
While scholars have difficulty agreeing on the precise functions of political 
parties in a democratic society, they all seem to accept the thesis that parties 
“are indispensable to the functioning of democratic political systems.”163  
Preserving the Constitution and promoting its objectives is the touchstone of 
American political parties; whatever their function—from recruiting and 
nominating candidates, to encouraging voters to go to the polls—the parties 
perform it in the name of guarding the Constitution.164 
In their book, Political Parties in America, Frank Sorauf and Paul Allen 
Beck claim that competitive political parties in every democracy perform at 
least three functions: (1) they select candidates and contest elections; (2) they 
propagandize on behalf of a party ideology or program; and (3) they attempt to 
guide the elected officeholders of government to provide particular policy or 
patronage benefits.165  Perhaps the most obvious role of parties is the 
responsibility they assume in the electoral process and, thus, the campaign 
process.  The process by which political leaders are recruited, elected and 
appointed to office form the central core of party activity.166  Since the parties 
provide campaign services and funds to candidates, they are major players in 
 
 163. WILLIAM J. KEEFE, PARTIES, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA 30 (7th ed. 
1994).  See CLINTON ROSSITER, PARTIES AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 60 (1960) (“Political parties 
and democracy are inseparable phenomena”); Nancy L. Rosenblum, Political Parties as 
Membership Groups, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 813, 814 (2000). (“Political parties are the voluntary 
associations principally committed to making democracy.”); Geoffrey M. Wardle, Comment, 
Time to Develop a Post-Buckley Approach to Regulating the Contributions and Expenditures of 
Political Parties: Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Campaign Committee, 
46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 603, 626 (1996) (“Parties are central to American politics. . . .  They are 
essential elements to overcoming the disassociation Americans have with the political system.”). 
 164. See Kesler, supra note 151, at 230; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 157, at 1077-78 
(“Political parties represent the people not only in their views about ordinary politics, but also in 
their views about the deepest meanings of the Constitution and the country.”). 
 165. FRANK J. SORAUF & PAUL ALLEN BECK , PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 12 (6th ed. 
1988). 
 166. KEEFE, supra note 163, at 32. See ROSSITER, supra note 163, at 40 (noting that the 
parties establish and maintain the machinery that puts men and women in public office, and that 
parties do this at four key points: nominations, campaigns, elections, and appointments). 
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both the federal and state campaign processes.167  In fact, it has been argued 
that, today, parties are the “single most important player in the federal 
campaign process.” 168  They are no longer known merely for their role as a 
distributor of the spoils of local government elections; instead, they have 
become national organizations that focus on providing campaign services.169  
One important campaign service they provide is educating the public; they 
transmit political values and information to large numbers of current and future 
voters.170  They help to educate the voters on issues, provide a linkage between 
the people and the government, and simplify the choices that voters have to 
make in elections.171 
While political parties are a constant in the electoral process, they serve 
other functions in society as well.  For example, educating the public, though it 
can be considered a campaign service, is also a social function that parties 
serve.172  In addition, they act as buffers and adjusters between individuals and 
society and provide an object to which citizens of the United States can extend 
allegiance.173  Parties also serve as groups that people can identify with, 
become active in, contribute to, work within, become officers of and 
participate in setting agendas, goals and strategies.174 
Beck and Sorauf also argue that there are four “indirect consequences” of 
American party activity that benefit society.175 First, political parties 
participate in the social unification of the American electorate; they symbolize 
and represent a political point of view, offering uninformed or underinformed 
citizens a map of the political world.176  Second, American parties contribute to 
the accumulation of political power.177  They aggregate masses of political 
individuals and groups, organizing blocks powerful enough to govern or to 
 
 167. See Marsh, supra note 20, at 963-64. 
 168. Nahra, supra note 12, at 88. 
 169. Id.  See Marsh, supra note 20, at 963. 
 170. See SORAUF & BECK, supra note 165, at 15. 
 171. See KEEFE, supra note 163, at 33. 
 172. See ROSSITER, supra note 163, at 48.  For example, Rossiter noted that the Republicans, 
through President Abraham Lincoln, educated the nation in the true nature and implications of 
slavery, while the Democratic party, through President Franklin Roosevelt, sought to educate us 
on the proper relations of private enterprise and public authority.  Id. at 48. 
 173. See id. at 49-50.  In regards to the former role, Rossiter noted that “the parties are still 
important dispensers of those aids, favors, and immunities . . . that make it possible for men and 
women to live reasonably confident lives in a harsh environment.”  Id. at 49.  Keefe also 
commented that parties serve as brokers among the organized interests of American society 
because they help keep group conflicts within tolerable limits.  KEEFE, supra note 163, at 34. 
 174. Rosenblum, supra note 163, at 817. 
 175. SORAUF & BECK , supra note 165, at 15-16. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 16. 
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oppose those who govern.178  Third, they dominate the recruitment of political 
leadership.179  Many individuals in public service entered into such service 
through a political party, and because parties are present in all levels of the 
federal government, they are able to recruit and elevate leadership from one 
level to the next.180  Finally, parties are a force of unification in the divided 
American political system.181 As one author noted, they bring people of diverse 
political views together; by providing a structure to bring divergent social and 
ideological groups together, parties limit the destructive impact of 
factionalism.182 
Because political parties and PACs provide similar services, it is important 
to differentiate between the two to understand why political parties deserve to 
be treated differently than PACs.  Beck and Sorauf identified five 
characteristics of political parties that distinguish them from other political 
organizations: (1) the extent to which they pursue their organizing through the 
contesting of elections; (2) the extensiveness and inclusiveness of their 
organizations and clientele; (3) their sole concentration on political avenues for 
achieving their goals; (4) their demonstrated stability and long life; and (5) 
their strength as cues and reference symbols in the decision making of 
individual citizens.183  The authors also noted that none of these characteristics 
alone sets the political parties apart from other political actors, but when taken 
together, and when the matter of degree is considered, no other political 
organization matches the political party.184 
The purpose political parties aim to serve also sets them apart from PACs 
and other political actors.  PACs usually serve a narrow interest in society; 
 
 178. Id.  See ROSSITER, supra note 163, at 46 (noting that the minority party is expected to 
organize itself in the legislature for the primary purpose of checking the majority party). 
 179. SORAUF & BECK, supra note 165, at 16. 
 180. Id. (“One needs only to run down a list of the members of the cabinet or even the federal 
courts to see how many of them entered public service through a political party or through 
partisan candidacy for office.”). 
 181. Id.  See Wardle, supra note 163, at 627 (noting that parties offer structure that facilitates 
consensus and overcomes divisiveness). 
 182. See Wardle, supra note 163, at 627.  Balkin and Levinson also noted that parties are 
important institutions for translating and interpreting popular will and negotiating among various 
interest groups and factions.  See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 157, at 1066. 
 183. SORAUF & BECK, supra note 165, at 19.  Other authors have noted the uniqueness of 
political parties.  One article argued that only political parties are engaged in recruiting and 
nominating candidates and educating the public about those candidates and issues for the 
astonishing number and kind of elective offices at the local, state and federal levels in the United 
States; no other group takes a similarly comprehensive view of the public interest and political 
agenda.  Rosenblum, supra note 166, at 815.  The same article stated that only parties “routinely, 
pervasively, and legitimately exercise influence from within government.”  Id.  In addition, the 
right to be on the election ballot separates political parties from all other political associations.  
Id. at 814-15. 
 184. See SORAUF & BECK, supra note 165, at 15. 
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they have one purpose and want to further only one objective.  Political parties, 
on the other hand, serve multiple purposes, and are not “ideological or 
narrowly bound to specific views.”185  Parties have to steer a middle course to 
be able to win or retain office, where other political organizations often 
advocate only one issue and take one side of that issue, not worrying about 
appealing to the masses.186  Because parties are multi-interest groups they 
stand in a unique position to originate policies and to find a way to broaden the 
special concerns of others; and their policies are typically more realistic than 
those that emerge from single-interest political groups.187 
Developing an exact description of the functions of political parties and 
their role in society is not necessary.  The point is that they “provide a whole 
bundle of valuable benefits,”188 and their part in fostering the democratic 
society in America is extremely important. 
Just as the Court failed to recognize the constitutional significance of 
parties in Colorado II, it also neglected to take notice of the role of parties in 
American society.  To achieve the goal of promoting democracy, political 
parties must elect candidates.  In order to elect candidates, however, parties 
have to be able to spend money.  Buckley held that contributions, and thus 
coordinated expenditures, could be limited because they entailed “only a 
marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free 
communication.”189  On the other hand, restrictions on expenditures were 
unconstitutional because they represented “substantial rather than merely 
theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech.”190  If the 
Court in Colorado II had considered the role of parties in society, it would 
have realized that in the context of political parties, the distinction between 
contributions and expenditures articulated in Buckley breaks down.191 
A political party’s spending in coordination with its candidate is the party’s 
only means of communication.  Advocating for candidates and putting those 
candidates in office is how parties speak; to do this they must be able to spend 
money in coordination with those candidates they seek to elect.  Judge Arnold 
made this point in Lamb, in which he argued that it is difficult to say that a 
political party’s contribution “does not communicate the underlying basis for 
support.”192  He also noted that a party’s contributions are not merely 
 
 185. Lekich, supra note 16, at 1879. 
 186. See Marsh, supra note 20, at 967. 
 187. See ROSSITER, supra note 161, at 42. 
 188. Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1479, 1530 (1994) (arguing that political parties are invaluable for the work they do in keeping 
agency costs down and in providing some degree of accountability). 
 189. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 (1976). 
 190. Id. at 19. 
 191. See Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 192. Id. 
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“symbolic expressions”193 of support; rather they are more like substantive 
political statements than other’s contributions.194  Judge Arnold also suggested 
that First Amendment freedoms at stake in Lamb were weightier than those 
involved in Buckley because spending on its candidates is the party’s speech, 
not just one avenue for the party to communicate.195  Yet, the Court in 
Colorado II gave this no consideration.  Instead, it upheld the distinction in 
Buckley, and overlooked the idea that in an election, the parties’ right to 
coordinate with their candidates entails much more than a marginal restriction 
on their First Amendment freedoms. 
V.  THE MOST RECENT ADDITION TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
The 1974 Amendments to the FECA were adopted in response to the 
Watergate scandal.  Similarly, the collapse of Enron, a corporation that made 
large and continuous contributions to both Republican and Democrat 
candidates, resulted in the Congress passing, and President George W. Bush 
signing, new campaign finance legislation.196  The legislation was a bipartisan 
effort sponsored by Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) and Rep. Martin 
Meehan (D-Mass.).  The main provisions of the bill included a ban on 
unregulated soft money as well as new regulations pertaining to issue ads.197 
Before the most recent bill was signed into law, campaigns were financed 
through both soft money and hard money.198  Hard money was used for 
election activities expressly advocating the defeat or election of a specific 
candidate.199  Soft money, on the other hand, was raised to support get-out-the-
vote efforts, party building, grass roots activities, and issue ads—those ads that 
do not advocate for the election or defeat of a specific candidate.200  The FECA 
originally regulated only hard money, while leaving soft money unlimited and 
unregulated.201 
 
 193. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). 
 194. Id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. Jill Zuckman, House OKs Bill to Ban Soft Money Donations; Measure Still Needs 
Approval in Senate, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 14, 2002, at A1; see also Alison Mitchell, Campaign 
Finance Bill Wins Final Approval in Congress and Bush Says He’ll Sign It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
2002, at A1 (noting that “the new legislation will make the most far-ranging changes since 1974 
in how political parties and outside groups participate in campaigns”). 
 197. Charles Lane, Court Tests Likely for Shays-Meehan; “Issue Ad” Rules Viewed as 
Vulnerable, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2002, at A4. 
 198. See Zuckman, supra note 196, at A1. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. 
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The new campaign finance law prohibits parties from raising soft 
money.202  Supporters of the law argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Colorado II is evidence that the Court would find a soft money ban consistent 
with Buckley.203  One of the most controversial portions of the new law 
prohibits certain groups from running issue ads thirty days before a primary 
and sixty days before a general election.204  Those who oppose the law argue 
that under Buckley the provision regarding issue ads is unconstitutional.205 
As one article pointed out, there are winners and losers under the new 
campaign finance laws.206  Among the winners are PACs, whose status will be 
elevated because of the emphasis on smaller, regulated donations.207  Political 
parties, on the other hand, are among the losers, as they will lose a large 
portion of money that has financed many of their activities.208 
Within hours of the President signing the bill, both the National Rifle 
Association and Senator Mitch McConnell filed lawsuits challenging the 
constitutionality of the law.209  Unfortunately, the opinion in Colorado II 
provides little guidance to either those who support the law or those who 
oppose it.  While one author noted that the Supreme Court, no longer a 
champion of political speech, would probably uphold the new law,210 as argued 
above, the decision in Colorado II was inconsistent with the Court’s decision 
in Buckley, and leaves open the question of the constitutionality of this new 
campaign finance reform legislation. 
 
 202. See Mitchell, supra note 196, at A1.  In exchange for the soft money ban, the limits on 
hard money were loosened slightly.  See id.  Under the new law, individuals can give a federal 
candidate $2000 as opposed to the current limit of $1000.  See id.  Furthermore, the aggregate 
limit an individual can give to all federal candidates and political parties will rise from $25,000 a 
year to $95,000 for each two-year election cycle. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Alison Mitchell, House G.O.P. Proposes Rival to Campaign Finance Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 13, 2002, at A26. 
Lawyers on both sides of the debate say the most vulnerable part of the bill is probably its 
“issue ad” provision, which applies disclosure rules and contribution limits to TV and 
radio advertising—paid for by corporations, unions and independent advocacy groups—
that “refers” to federal candidates in the weeks immediately before a primary or general 
election. 
Lane, supra note 197, at A4. 
 205. See id. 
 206. Jim Drinkard, Some Win, Some Lose with Changes, USA TODAY, Mar. 19, 2002, at 2A. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Elisabeth Bumiller & Philip Shenon, President Signs Bill on Campaign Gifts; Begins 
Money Tour, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002, at A1. 
 210. D. Bruce La Pierre, Editorial, A Little Problem of Constitutionality:. . .But the Court 
May Not Save the Day, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 27, 2002, at B7.  Lapierre noted that 
“[the Supreme Court is] ready—just like Congress and president George W. Bush—to sacrifice 
some of our political freedom on the altar of post-Enron public passions.”  Id. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
At first glance, the majority in Colorado II seemed to follow the precedent 
set in Buckley; independent expenditure limitations are unconstitutional, while 
those on contributions, including coordinated expenditures, are constitutional.  
There was a big difference in the two cases, however: Buckley involved 
individuals and political committees, while Colorado II involved a political 
party.  This was an important distinction, one the Court did not seem to 
recognize.  This failure resulted in an opinion that left much to be desired, 
causing the campaign finance area to remain murky.  The impact of the Court’s 
inattention to these issues is that Buckley and Colorado II are inconsistent with 
each other, which will ultimately lead to confusion in campaign finance laws.  
Furthermore, because the Colorado II majority failed to acknowledge that 
political parties are not the same as other political actors because of their 
constitutional status, as well as their exceptional role in carrying out the goals 
of democracy, it also did not consider the possibility that parties’ spending on 
the election of its candidates is necessary if they are to fulfill those 
responsibilities.  While the weakest link in the Court’s decision in Colorado II 
is that it failed to consider the above points, the conclusion is also the weakest 
link in a long chain of Supreme Court campaign finance decisions that will 
ultimately result in more confusion in this area of the law, and with the passage 
of the new campaign finance legislation, that confusion is likely to come 
sooner rather than later. 
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